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Abstract
We study the impact of active labour market policies (ALMPs)  in the context of an
applied general equilibrium model for the Dutch labour market. By using a calibrated
general equilibrium model we try to narrow down the possible range of the net effect of
various ALMPs.  We consider the impact of publicly provided relief and training programs,
and subsidies in the private sector for low-productive workers (‘vouchers’) on the steady state
of the labour market (the ‘long-run’). Our findings are:
1. Relief jobs reduce unemployment and increase production in the public sector. How-
ever, higher wage and search costs crowd out private sector employment and production.
Overall production falls.
2. Training programs reduce unemployment more than relief jobs. Individuals that par-
ticipate in training programs (re-)gain  (lost) skills. In this way training programs speed
up the process by which workers move into private sector employment. Search costs
for firms fall. However, additional wage pressure leaves a negative net effect on private
sector employment. Production is hardly affected though, due to the training effect on
average labour productivity.
3. Vouchers for low-productive workers reduce labour costs and hence increase private
sector employment and production. Unemployment falls by less than under the relief
and training programs.
All programs lead to a rise in the budget deficit, especially the relief and training program.
The voucher program is less expensive, as there are substantial savings on transfers, whereas
the tax base rises. We further report some sensitivity analyses on assumptions for which we
have a weak empirical basis. The numerical outcomes are quite sensitive to some parameters
in the wage-bargaining model and the effect of training on an individual’s productivity level.
However, qualitatively the results are unaffected.
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1  Introduction
Unemployment rose dramatically in The Netherlands during the 1980s.’  Along with the rise in
total unemployment, the number and share of individuals unemployed for more than a year rose
sharply. Over the past decade unemployment in The Netherlands has fallen substantially. How-
ever, the share of long-term unemployed in the unemployment pool remains high in comparison
with many other OECD countries (see e.g. OECD (1999)). To fight the rise and persistence
of long-term unemployment the Dutch government implemented various active labour market
policies (ALMPs) over the past decade.2
In this paper we consider the impact of these ALMPs in the context of an applied general
equilibrium (AGE) model for the Dutch labour market. We study the impact on key variables
like (long-term) unemployment, employment, production and government expenditures. The
AGE model we use in this paper is an adapted version of the MIMIC model, the AGE model of
CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis for the labour market.
Why do we study active labour market policies in the context of an AGE model? As noted
by Calmfors (1994, p.36):
[T]he  main conclusion from this analysis is that active labour market policy may
give rise to a diverse set of effects, some of which are favourable and some of which
are not. One cannot from a theoretical analysis evaluate the net impact of these
policies. There are also severe problems of interpretation with much of the empirical
macroeconomic research and a lot of conflicting evidence from the microeconomic
studies. There are also crucial areas such as the optimal timing of labour-market-
policy interventions as well as the optimal mix and size of programmes that remain
more or less unexplored.”
By explicitly modeling the behaviour of firms and workers, and the technology and design
features of ALMPs, we can study the effects of ALMPs in a coherent structure. Furthermore, by
calibrating the model we try to get more insight into the net effect of ALMPs on unemployment,
government expenditures etc. Unfortunately, for some parameters in our model we have a rather
weak empirical basis. Hence, we also consider how sensitive the results are to these parameters.
The paper has the following outline. In Section 2 we briefly discuss the main characteristics of
current ALMPs in The Netherlands, together with some indicators of their performance. Section
3 outlines the model we constructed for Dutch ALMPs, and the calibration of the model. In
Section 4 we present the simulation results on various ALMPs. A sensitivity analysis of the
‘The research for this Research Memorandum was carried out in cooperation with CPB Netherlands Bureau
for Economic Policy Analysis.
2See  Gravesteijn-Ligthelm et al. (1998) for a historical overview of ALMPs in The Netherlands.
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results on some key assumptions is given in Section 5. Finally, in Section 6 we summarise our
main findings and give some concluding remarks.
2 ALMPs in The Netherlands
The wide range of ALMPs can broadly be divided into: i) job broking by employment offices;
ii) training programs in the public or private sector; and iii) subsidized jobs in the public or
private sector (see e.g. Calmfors (1994)). In this paper we focus on training programs in
the public sector, subsidised jobs in the public sector (relief jobs) and subsidies in the private
sector (‘vouchers’). Within these broad categories there is room for a huge variation in the
construction of programs. Programs differ in the targeted group, the duration of the job or
the subsidy, compensation to participants, etc. Table 1 summarises the main characteristics
of current ALMPs in The Netherlands. Since 1998, the ‘Wet Inschakeling Werkzoekenden’
( WIW, Unemployed Activation Act) is running. The aim of the ‘WIW’ is to help the long-term
unemployed and unemployed youngsters to find regular employment. The ‘WI W’ replaces some
of the older programs like the ‘Banenpool’ (Labour pools), and the ‘Jeugdwerkgarantieplan’
(J WG, Youth Employment Guarantee Scheme).
As of yet we have no information on participation in and the outflow from the ‘WIW’.
However, Table 2 gives some information on the programs running in 1996 that appear to be
the most relevant for this study. We report the number of participants, the yearly outflow
rates to various destinations, and two efficiency measures:3  a) the ‘deadweight loss’, and b)
the substitution rate. The deadweight loss denotes the share of participants that would have
found employment anyway, whereas the substitution rate denotes the share of vacancies filled
by subsidised workers substituting other job seekers.
2.1 Relief Jobs
First, we consider the relief programs: the ‘Banenpool’, the ‘Melkert-1’  program and the
‘Melkert-3’ program. The outflow from the ‘Banenpool’ to regular jobs is rather low, a meagre
3% per year. Most individuals that do leave the program flow to ‘other destinations’. The
flow to ‘other destinations’ includes the flow to the ‘Melkert-1’  program, to welfare or disability
benefits, and women who gave birth. In the past, reintegration of long-term unemployed and
the provision of basic skills was the official goal of the ‘Banenpool’. However, since 1996 the
official goal has been changed to increasing the outflow to regular employment. The contracts
have been changed from an unlimited to a limited duration. The ‘deadweight’ in the ‘Banen-
pool’ seems to be quite low, given the low job prospects of participants before
program. ‘Substitution’ of other job seekers appears to be somewhat higher.
3Efficiency measures are taken from Gravestein-Ligthelm et al. (1998) and Welters (1998
they entered the
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Table 1: Current active labour market policies in The Netherlands
Program Entry requirement Compensat ion Type of job
WIW-Dienstbetrekking > 1 year unemployed,
(Unemployed Activation or unemployed and
Act - Employment) max. 23 years old.
WI W- Werkervaringsplaats
(Unemployed Activation
Act - Experience Job)
> 1 year unemployed,
or unemployed and
max. 23 years old
In- en Doorstroombanen
(Inflow and Flow- Through Jobs)
> 1 year unemployed and
on benefits/social security
Melkert-2
Melkert-3
VL W (Reduction
Long- Term Unemployed)
SPAK
> 1 year
on benefi
unemployed and
ts/social security
welfare recipient
> 1 year unemployed
all employees with salary
< 115% minimum wage-
max. 120% min. wage
min. 100% min. wage,
max. collectively agreed
wage
max. 130% min. wage
(after 4 years: 150%)
lOO-120%  min. wage,
employer receives 8,168.-
euro per year
employee remains on
benefits
max. 130% min. wage,
employer receives 2,042.-  euro
per new hire
employer receives 830.-
euro per employee earning
<115%  min. wage-
public and private sector,
32 hours per week, max. 2 years
public and private sector,
32 hours per week, 6- 12 months
public sector, additional work,
32 hours per week,
no limit on duration
regular job in private sector,
at least 32 hours per week,
6 months - 2 years
regular job
regular job in private/public
sector, max. 4 years
regular job in private/public
sector, no limit on duration
Sources: Gravestein-Ligthelm et al. (1998) and Ministry of Social Affairs.
Table 2: Participation, outflow, and efficiency indicators in 1996
Program Part icipants Outflow to regular Outflow to other ‘Deadweigh@ ‘SubstitutiorF
work destinationsa
J WG (Youth Employment 24,810 19% 17% 27% 14%
Guarantee Scheme)
Banenpool (Labour pools) 22,932 3% 11% 3% 10%
M e l k e r t -  1 18,000 5% 8% ? ?
Melkert-2 6,000 ? ?
Melkert-3 (50 projects) ? ? 3 3. .
VL W (Reduction Long- 110,000 48% 32%
Term Unemployed)
Sources: Gravesteijn-Ligthelm et al. (1998),  Welters (1998) and Ministry of Social Affairs.
“Other destinations includes outflow to another program, to welfare or disability benefits and women who gave birth.
b‘Deadweight’  denotes the share of the flow of participants out of the program that would have found employment anyway.
C‘Subsitution’  denotes the share of the flow of participants out of the program that substitutes other job seekers.
Outflow from the ‘Melkert-I  ‘4 program to regular employment is somewhat higher than
from the ‘Banenpool’, but still quite low. Recently, the duration of contracts has become more
limited. The ‘IMeIlcert-3’  program also creates jobs in the public sector, but targets individuals
who remain on welfare benefits. We have no information on the outflow from this program.
We have no information on the extent of ‘deadweight’ and ‘substitution’ from the ‘Mellcert’-
programs.
2.2 Training programs
Turning to the training program, the ‘Jeugdwerkgarantieplan’, the outflow to regular employment
from the ‘JWG’  is much higher than the outflow from relief jobs to regular employment. This
is likely to be due to differences in the targeted group, unemployed youngsters versus long-term
unemployed, and due to differences in the extent to which participants receive training. The
outflow to ‘other destinations’ is also much higher. This might be due to the limited duration of
contracts in the ‘JWG’.  ‘Deadweight’ seems to be much higher for the training program, given
the more favourable job prospects of unemployed youngsters,  whereas participants also seem to
substitute more easily for other job seekers.
2 3. ‘Vouchers’
Finally, we consider the programs that provide subsidies for firms that hire previously long-term
unemployed job seekers (‘vouchers’) : the ‘Melkert-2 ’ program and the ‘Vermindering Langdurig
Werklozen’  ( VLW, Reduction Long-term Unemployed). Data on the outflow is less informative,
as outflow may occur because the match dissolves, or because the subsidy period ended, or both.
Unfortunately we have no information on the extent of ‘deadweight’ and ‘substitution’ of the
‘MeZkert-2’  program. ‘Deadweight’ and ‘substitution’ under the ‘VLW’  program is much higher
than for the relief and training programs. All long-term unemployed are targeted, even those
that find employment in the absence of the subsidy. Furthermore, the subsidised long-term
unemployed subsitute a substantial part of competing job seekers.
We use the data on ALMPs in The Netherlands below, in the calibration of the flow model.
3 Modeling ALMPs
We model three types of active labour market policies: i) targeted subsidies for jobs in the private
sector; ii) relief jobs (in the public sector); and iii) training programs in the public sector. We
incorporate these ALMPs in a stripped down version of MIMIC, the applied general equilibrium
model of CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (for a complete overview of
4Named after the minister under whose responsibility the program was enacted.
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the MIMIC model see Gelauff and Graafland (1994), a small scale version and some recent
extensions are discussed in Bovenberg et al. (1998)). The main simplifications of the stripped
down version are exogenous labour supply, no (physical) capital, no schooling decision, and no
division by sector. We use a stripped down version of MIMIC to keep the results tractable and
to focus on the crucial mechanisms that play a role in the impact of the ALMPs that we study.
First we give an informal overview of our stripped down model, and consider, qualitatively,
the impact of ALMPs on our model economy. Next, we outline the flow model that lies at the
core of our model. Then we consider the optimal search and selection strategy of firms and
workers. Finally we consider collective wage formation and government expenditures.5
3.1 The model - an informal overview
Our model economy is populated by firms and workers. Firms maximise profits and workers
maximise utility, given technology and government policy. Not all workers are employed at
any point in time. The flow from (old) unproductive production sites to (new) productive
production sites involves costly search by firms and workers. Hence, at any point of time, part
of the workers is searching for a job, and part of the jobs are searching for a worker. That is, the
model features equilibrium unemployment. Furthermore, even in the absence of costly search the
labour market will be characterized  by equilibrium unemployment, as wages are determined by
unions and employers’  federations in a ‘right-to-manage’ bargaining structure.  Unions maximize
their utility by demanding a wage above the ‘market clearing’ level.
To highlight the main channels through which ALMPs affect our model, we have to be more
explicit about firm and worker behaviour. Figure 1 below gives a highly stylised overview of
our model, where we focus on the labour market. In the labour market firms have to make
two decisions: they decide on the profit maximising level of employment (and the associated
optimal number of vacancies), and they decide on which workers to accept. Productivity is
heterogeneous. When a firm and a worker meet they take a random draw from a productivity
distribution. Some productivity realizations will  be unprofitable to the firm (due to the presence
of minimum wage legislation). The share of contacts with workers that is profitable to the firm
is denoted by the acceptance rate of the firm. Whereas firms decide on their level of vacancies
and which workers to accept, workers choose the time they devote to job search (the search
intensity) and which jobs to accept (the acceptance rate of workers). Some wage offers fall short
of their reservation wage.
The number of vacancies, the number of job seekers and their search effort, and the accep-
tance rates of firms and workers are the inputs for the so-called ‘matching process’. The matching
process is formalised by a matching function that relates the number of matches (‘output’) to
5A more elaborate discussion of the model, the calibration of the model in particular, is given in Jongen et al.
(2000).
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the number of searching units (‘inputs’). With knowledge of the number of matches we can
determine how many individuals are employed and how many are unemployed. We distinguish
between low- and high-productive unemployment, where we associate low-productive unemploy-
ment with individuals that have lost part of their skills. Indeed, this assumption is driven by
the empirical finding that there is negative duration dependence in the probability of finding
employment in a given time interval in unemployment (see e.g. Devine and Kiefer (1991)). Al-
though long-term unemployment does not correspond directly with our pool of low-productive
unemployed, as we will see below, long-term unemployed are more likely to be low-productive
in our model. Individuals may regain their lost skills in regular employment (or the training
program, as we will see below).
The relative shares of individuals in regular employment and in the various states outside
regular employment determine the fall-back position of workers in the wage bargain, via which
they affect the wage outcome. Furthermore, average productivity depends on the share of low-
and high-productive workers. Wages and productivity, combined with search costs for vacancies,
feed back into the optimal employment decision by firms. Furthermore, as workers in high- and
low-productive unemployment differ in their search and acceptance behaviour, the relative shares
of these states affect the ‘effective’ number of job seekers.
The model is scale independent, that is, the unemployment rate and all other shares do not
depend on labour supply. However, we have drawn a dotted box around the labour market to
highlight that labour supply determines the size of the market.
The government transfers unemployment benefits to the unemployed. Combined with sub-
sidies in the private sector, these transfers determine government outlays. To keep a balanced
budget the government levies taxes on all workers, both employed and unemployed.
3.1.1 The impact of relief jobs
Outside regular employment, low-productive individuals can participate in relief jobs. The
government posts vacancies for relief jobs. Compensation in relief jobs equals the minimum
wage level. Production by relief job workers is a fraction of their compensation level! For
simplicity we deduct the production by relief job workers from the expenditures on wages for
relief job workers. In our base model we assume that individuals do not regain lost skills in relief
.jobs .
The higher compensation level in relief jobs implies that it is optimal for participants to
reduce their search effort for locating private sector vacancies, and they become more selective
towards job offers from the private sector. Furthermore, search effort also suffers from the fact
that participants devote part of their valuable leisure time to working (these adverse effects are
6Assuming that participants in relief jobs would fully cover their costs begs the question why private fims  do
not create these jobs.
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Figure 1: The model - an overview
typically referred to in the literature as the ‘lock-in’ effect, see e.g. Calmfors (1994)). Search
costs for firms rise. The relatively high compensation level in relief jobs (relative to benefits in
low-productive unemployment) increases wage pressure. Via higher wage and search costs, relief
jobs crowd out private sector employment. When the government runs a net loss on relief jobs,
tax rates have to rise. This will put further strains on participation of agents in the private
sector.
3.1.2 The impact of training jobs
Low-productive individuals may also participate in training jobs. The government posts vacan-
cies for training jobs. Individuals in the training program receive the minimum wage. Individuals
in the training program do not produce output, they receive training. We assume that training
costs per unit time period are a fraction of their compensation level. We further assume that
individuals in the training program fully regain their lost skills.
Like the relief program, the higher compensation level in the training program adversely
affects the search and acceptance behaviour of the participants for regular employment. Fur-
1 1
thermore, they also have to devote part of their time to training, which further reduces their
search effort. However, as participants regain their lost skills, they expect to receive higher
payment in the private sector than before the training. This has a positive effect on the search
effort of participants and makes more job offers acceptable to them. Furthermore, they become
more attractive to firms which share in the higher productivity (these positive effects on an
individual’s skills and hence on the search and acceptance behaviour of workers (and firms) are
typically referred to in the literature as the ‘treatment effect’, see e.g. Calmfors (1994)). Search
costs for firms fall when the ‘treatment effect’ dominates the ‘lock-in’ effect. Firms further
benefit from the higher productivity level. Whether or not labour costs per unit of output fall
depends further on the effect of training programs on the wage outcome. Individuals prefer to
be in the state of training jobs relative to being in the state of low-productive unemployment,
which increases wage pressure. When labour costs per unit of output fall, production, and po-
tentially employment, rise. Furthermore, the net effect on government expenditures determines
the effect on tax rates. A net loss implies higher taxes, which will adversely affect private sector
production and employment.
3.1.3 The impact of vouchers
Finally, we consider the impact of subsidies in the private sector for low-productive workers
(‘vouchers’). We consider a subsidy that is paid out to the employer as long as an individual is
low-productive.7
The subsidy makes low-productive job seekers, i.e. low-productive unemployed and partic-
ipants in the relief program, more attractive to firms. They will post more vacancies, ceteris
paribus,  and will accept more applicants as the subsidy lowers the minimum productivity re-
quired to cover minimum wage expenditures. As firms post more vacancies and are willing to
take on more applicants, workers in low-productive unemployment and the relief program will
increase their search effort for regular employment.
The subsidy scheme will increase wage pressure. Indeed, like any rise in productivity, workers
will claim part of the subsidy via the wage bargain. In addition, wage pressure will mount
further as individuals in low-productive unemployment and relief jobs are more likely to find
employment.
The subsidy for low-productive workers will increase private sector employment, provided
that the costs do not exceed the savings by too much. When the government runs a net loss,
higher taxes will again adversely affect private sector production and employment.
Below we consider the model in more detail, as we consider the specification of the optimis-
7We  assume that the government has full information on whether or not an individual match is low- or high-
productive.
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ing behaviour of firms and workers, technology and government policy. At the end of each
subsection we briefly discuss the calibration of the model that is specified before. We start with
the flow model that lies at the core of the model.
3.2 The flow model
3.2.1 Specification of the flow model
Figure 2 below depicts the flow model we use to simulate ALMPs.  We distinguish between
the following states in the labour market: low- and high-productive employment, El and Eh
respectively, low- and high-productive unemployment, Ul and uh respectively, relief jobs, R,
and training programs, T.
First consider the states of employment and unemployment. Individuals in low- and high-
productive unemployment move into (regular) employment at rates ~~1  el and nUh &, respectively.
Individuals in low- and high-productive employment become unemployed at rates ael Ul and9
Deh,uh, respectively. Furthermore, we assume that high-productive individuals run a risk /Tub,@
of becoming low-productive unemployed when they are unemployed, i.e. they run the risk that
they lose part of their skills. On the other hand, we assume that low-productive individuals
become high-productive again in employment at rate Tel  eh, i.e. they may regain their lost skills
Now consider the states of relief jobs and training ‘programs. Only low-productive unem-
ployed individuals are eligible for a relief job or placement in a training program, and they flow
into these states at rates r,l,, and rul,t, respectively. Individuals in relief jobs do not regain their
lost skills. Hence, exit from relief jobs is either back to low-productive unemployment, at rate
G,UlY or to a regular low-productive job, at rate r,,el. Individuals that participate in training
programs may regain their lost skills, or they may not. If they do regain their lost skills they exit
either to high-productive unemployment (individuals can only participate in a training program
for a limited time period), at rate q@, or they exit to high-productive employment, at rate
rt,eh  l 8 For some individuals the training will be unsuccesful.  Hence, part of the participants in
the training program will flow back to low-productive unemployment once their training period
ends, this occurs at rate qul.
The rates at which workers flow back to either low- or high-productive unemployment (~+l,
geh,uh,  &,I&  ,q uh and ~~1)  are exogenous in the model. The rates at which individuals in
high-productive unemployment lose their skills, rUh ul,3 and the rate at which individuals regain
their lost skills in low-productive employment, Tel  ehy are also exogenous. The rates at which>
individuals move into employment, relief jobs and the training program (rul,el,  Xuh,eh, 7r,l,,  ,
‘Note that participants in training programs do not exit to low-productive employment. Hence, we implicitly
assume that individuals that did not regain their lost skills in the training program yet, do not search for a regular
job.
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Figure 2: Flows and stocks
7r,17t,  ~,,,l and xt,++J are endogenous. We consider their determination below. Note that for
simplicity we only consider steady states, i.e. when the inflow into a particular state equals the
outflow, for all states. Hence, the simulation results should be interpreted as ‘long-run’. We do
not consider the transition path from the initial steady state to the new steady state (this would
require that we specify the behaviour of all agents along the transition path). In a steady state
we can express the stocks in terms of the flow rates, independent of initial conditions.g
3.2.2 Calibration of the flow model
Table 3 below gives the data we use to calibrate the flow model, and the calibrated parameters.
The model is calibrated on data for the Dutch labour market in 1993. We calibrate the flow
model for three different levels of education: high-skilled, low-skilled and unskilled.1°
We have data on the stocks of high- and low-productive unemployment, relief jobs, training
jobs and total employment, by level of education. We associate high-productive unemployment
with the stock of individuals on unemployment benefits, and low-productive unemployment with
the stock of individuals on welfare that are obliged to search for a job. Furthermore, we have
data on the flow rates into employment out of unemployment, the rate at which individuals flow
‘The  resulting expressions for the stocks in terms of the flows are given in the Appendix.
“The data indicates that they have rather different productivity profiles.
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from relief and training jobs back into unemployment and the flow rate from high-productive
unemployment to low-productive unemployment.
We further have data on the average flow rates from relief jobs and training jobs into regular
employment. However, we do not use these data in the calibration. The data tell us that the
outflow rate into regular employment from relief jobs is in the order of 3 percent per year. The
outflow rate from low-productive unemployment into regular employment is in the order of 30
percent per year. Furthermore, the data tell us that the flow rate into regular employment
from training jobs is in the order of 15 percent per year. The outflow rate from high-productive
unemployment into regular employment is in the order of 70 percent per year. The discrepancies
in these outflow rates are due to differences in income, leisure time and the composition of the
group that participates in relief and training programs. Our model assumes that participants in
relief and training programs are drawn randomly from the pool of low-productive unemployed.
As a consequence we can not reproduce the low outflow rates from relief and training jobs
in our baseline calibration. The differences in income and leisure in the states of relief and
training programs relative to low- and high-productive unemployment are insufficient to generate
low enough search intensities and acceptance rates (discussed below) for participants in these
programs. In our baseline calibration we therefore let the model determine the outflow rate,
assuming that participation is random. We do some sensitivity analysis on the outflow rates
from relief and training jobs in Section 5.
The model suggests that if inflow into relief and training programs were random, the outflow
rate from relief jobs into low-productive employment is about half of the outflow rate from
low-productive unemployment. Furthermore, the model suggests that the outflow rate from
training programs would be in the order of 3 quarters of the outflow rate from high-productive
unemployment.
The inflow into relief and training jobs follows from the steady state assumption. The inflow
is rather low in a steady state, given the low outflow.
Finally, some remarks on the flow rate from high- to low-productive unemployment, and from
low- to high-productive employment. We have data on the average rate at which individuals
lose their entitlement for unemployment benefits. We assume that this is the flow rate from
high-productive unemployment to low-productive unemployment.
We have no data on the flow rate from low- to high-productive employment. We set rel eh so7
as to obtain a higher separation rate for low-productive than for high-productive employment
(in line with the scant evidence, see e.g. De Beer (1996)). Setting Tel,eh =0.757,+1  for the
high-skilled and Tel,eh =0.507zlh,+l for the low-skilled and unskilled yields plausible values for
the separation rate from low-productive employment relative to the separation rate from high-
productive employment.
We calibrate the separation rates from .high- and low-productive employment, relief and
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Table 3: Calibration of the flow model
Data
nuh,eh rul  ,el Tuh,ul uh Ul UT ut
high-skilled 0.800 0.404 0.211 0.039 0.025 0.001 0.000
low-skilled 0.760 0.383 0.211 0.048 0.044 0.004 0.004
unskilled 0.560 0.283 0.211 0.051 0.094 0.010 0.006
Calibration
aeh,uh ael  ,ul Or,ul qu1 *t,uh TT,,l rt,eh %d,T G1,t Tel,eh
high-skilled 0.034 0.045 0.076 0.131 0.031 0.242 0.578 0.016 0.006 0.158
low-skilled 0.042 0.183 0.087 0.183 0.044 0.233 0.571 0.037 0.105 0.105
unskilled 0.037 0.284 0.082 0.184 0.044 0.109 0.360 0.029 0.050 0.105
eh ez eh,uh eh,t e1 ,ul el,T eh,ul eh,r
high-skilled 0.908 0.040 0.758 0.003 0.041 0.001 0.191 0.006
low-skilled 0.870 0.049 0.745 0.067 0.050 0.004 0.126 0.009
unskilled 0.818 0.055 0.687 0.069 0.059 0.004 0.171 0.010
training jobs on the relative shares of the corresponding stocks and the flow rates into employ-
ment and relief and training jobs (see the Appendix).
Table 3 further gives information on the share of the different groups in employment, the
groups differ in the state they are in and their history. Indeed, we have the share of individuals
in high-productive employment that came from the state of high-productive unemployment and
training jobs, eeh uh> and eeh t3 respectively, the share of individuals in low-productive employment
that came from the state of low-productive unemployment and relief jobs, e+l and eel,, respec-
tively, and the share of individuals in high-productive employment that came from the state of
low-productive employment and from the state of low-productive unemployment and relief jobs
before that, e,h,+l and eeh,r respectively. To calculate the average productivity of employees we
have to keep track of these shares as the respective groups differ in their productivity profiles
(see below).
3.3 Matching jobs and workers
3.3.1 Specification of the matching process
In this section we specify the matching technologies. First, we consider the matching technology
for low- and high-productive employment. Subsequently, we consider the matching technology
for relief jobs and training programs.
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The flow rates from low-productive unemployment, high-productive unemployment, relief
jobs and training programs into regular employment are given bJv
TX = sx f mLxpea, x E {a  eh},  (214 eL),  (5 el},  {t,  eh}, (1)
where sx denotes the search effort exerted by individuals from the respective states (see below),
and fm, denotes their respective share of contacts that are acceptable to both the employer
and the respective job seekers (see below). l1 Futhermore, 0 denotes labour market tightness,
defined as 0 =V&/( sul el& + sub ehuh  + sr elR+ St,ehT) 7 WkT vpr,
by firms. Finally, 1-1  and cx  denote technology parameters.
is the stock of vacancies posted
In the next section we consider how
profit maximisation on the part of firms and utility maximisation by job seekers determine the
inputs in the matching process: the number of vacancies, the respective search efforts of the
various groups of job seekers and the respective share of job offers acceptable to both the firm
and job seekers.
Given the flow rates for job seekers we also have the rate at which vacancies are filled (note
that vacancies are homogeneous elr: ante, but yield a low-productive job if matched with a low-
productive unemployed or relief job worker, and yield a high-productive job when matched with
a high-productive unemployed or training program participant). The rate at which vacancies
are filled, zpr,  is given by
zpr  =
~ul,elul + nuh,ehUh  + nr,elR + rt,ehT
7T/ Pr
We assume a similar type of technology for the matching process for relief jobs and training
programs and low-productive unemployed. The flow rates into relief jobs and training programs
are given by
G.41  ,r = S,l,r/d$? (3)
%l ,t = S,l,tPtg? (4)
respectively. Sul,r and s,l t denote search effort exerted by low-productive unemployed individ-7
uals for relief jobs and placement in a training program, respectively. 8, and 8t denote tighness
in the market for relief jobs and training programs, respectively. 8, = s zUl a n d  et =u , s I”;tu, ,u 7
where Vr and Vt  denote the number of vacancies posted for relief jobs and the training program,
respectively. pr and pt denote technology parameters. The matching technologies do not contain
a variable that indicates the share of job offers that is accepted by both parties. Indeed, policy
l1  Aggregation of the respective flow rates times the respective stocks yields a constant-returns-to-scale matching
function.
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dictates that all applicants are accepted by the government, and compensation in the respective
ALMP is set so that all offers are accepted by low-productive unemployed job seekers. Below we
consider how the search effort by low-productive unemployed results from utility maximisation.
The number of vacancies for relief jobs and training programs is a policy parameter.
Given the flow rates of job seekers we also have the rate at which relief and training jobs are
filled, zT  and it respectively. These are given by
and
%1,tQ
Zt = -
vi
$
respectively.
3.3.2 Calibration of the matching process
Table 4 below gives the data we use to calibrate the matching process, the inputs from other
submodels and the calibrated parameters and stocks. The relative weight of vacancies in the
matching function, a,  is similar to the value in the original MIMIC model. We assume that the
relative weight of vacancies in the matching function is the same for relief and training jobs.
Given the other inputs, ~11,  and the flow rates we can rewrite the matching functions for the
technology parameter II.  The search effort of each group of job seekers contains a parameter that
is set so as to let 1-1  be the same across all job seekers (the parameter is normalized to unity for
high-productive job seekers). The rates at which vacancies for relief and training jobs are filled,
zT  and zt respectively, are chosen so as to let the technology parameter in the matching function
for these jobs, pr  and pt  respectively, equal 1-1  in the private sector. Hence, we assume that
the government has no technological advantage (or disadvantage) over private firms in acquiring
new workers for relief and training jobs.
The stocks of vacancies for relief and training jobs follow from the steady state assumption
and the other inputs in the respective matching functions.
3.4 Search strategy of firms
3.4.1 Specification of the search strategy of firms
Firms maximise profits by varying the number of vacancies per skill type. The optimal number
of vacancies follows from the optimal stock of employment per skill type.
The economy consists of three types of domestic firms. These firms employ, respectively,
high-skilled, low-skilled and unskilled workers. We assume a fixed number Ji  of symmetric firms
18
Table 4: Calibration of the matching process
Data and input from other submodels
uh Ul R T v a!
high-skilled 148.2 95.00 3.179 0.613 25.00 0.650
low-skilled 60.06 54.88 4.834 5.431 12.50 0.650
unskilled 37.55 68.55 7.574 4.205 7.000 0.650
Suh,eh sul  ,el sr,e1 St,eh SUl  ,T %d,t fmh fm1 .fmr fmt
high-skilled 1.030 0.632 0.380 0.630 0.067 0.078 0.693 0.570 0.568 0.818
low-skilled 0.989 0.684 0.418 0.678 0.119 0.408 0.763 0.556 0.555 0.837
unskilled 0.888 0.809 0.312 0.571 0.195 0.388 0.163 0.091 0.091 0.163
Calibrat ion
C L Pr Pt 2 VT vt
high-skilled 3.880 3.880 3.880 4.979 17.47 31.73 0.067 0.014
low-skilled 3.334 3.334 3.334 4.366 11.89 13.27 0.130 0.327
unskilled 17.02 17.02 17.02 4.484 217.1 235.4 0.007 0.010
Note: stocks are in thousands.
per skill type which produce output according to a linear production technology
where Y3 denotes t h e output produced by firm 3 I 3 -- 1 7 . . . I i7J using labour type b z
where h, 1,  and u denote high-skilled, low-skilled and unskilled, respectively. Qli  denotes the
average productivity of labour of type i and ei’ denotes the number of employees of type i
employed by firm j.  Aggregate output and employment by firms using labour type i are given
by x = C$,  yj and Ei = C$,  e$ respectively.
Firms of type i are perfect competitors, and hence make zero profits. In equilibrium, em-
ployment is found by equating the marginal labour cost per productivity unit with the output
price per productivity unit. The output price of firm j per productivity unit using labour type
i, d is given by
pli = WCi,j  /Qi, (8)
where wci,j denotes the per unit labour cost of labour type i for firm j.  Symmetric firms implies
pi= i’p’
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Per unit labour costs for labour type i, in a steady state, are given by
w4 = TiTi( 1 + c(q + rinJ/zpr,& (9)
Labour costs equal gross wages (including employers’ taxes), m,  plus the per period vacancy
cost to keep a constant (the optimal) workforce, wi  c (ai  + rint)/zpr,i)  (note that in a steady
state the average quit rate times the workforce has to equal the number of vacancies times the
rate at which these are filled), where c denotes a fraction, ai denotes the average separation rate
for labour type i, zpr,i denotes the average rate at which private sector vacancies are filled for
labour type i, and rint denotes the interest rate. The appropriate depreciation rate for vacancy
costs is given by the rate at which matches separate plus the interest rate (the optimal control
problem is given in Gelauff and Graafland  (1994)).
In a steady state, vacancies for labour type i, V&, equal the outflow from employment of
labour type i, ai &  times the average duration of a vacancy to be filled, l/zpr,+
Finally, we consider the demand for the products produced by the skill types i and the role
of foreign producers and consumers. Total domestic production follows from a CES function
with as inputs the commodities produced by firms using the different skill types. The optimal
allocation of consumers over the three types of commodities is derived from a CES sub-utility
function. The optimal allocation of demand over the three types of commodities is given by
where Yav  denotes the CES-weighted average output of the three types of commodities and pav
denotes the CES-weighted average price.  a denotes the partial  price elasticity of demand for the
three skill types. In line with empirical evidence we assume that the output of the three skill
types are imperfect substitutes (see Draper and Manders (1996)).
Demand is exerted both by domestic and foreign consumers. The allocation of demand by
domestic and foreign consumers depends on the terms of trade, and the preferences over domestic
and foreign production. The net demand for domestic goods, X,,  is given by
where p, denotes the average price of foreign goods. c denotes the subsitution elasticity between
domestic and foreign goods. The consumer price index, pc,  follows from the relative shares of
consumption of domestic and foreign production.
3.4.2 Calibration of the search strategy of firms
Most parameters of the production and demand structure are taken from the MINI-MIMIC
model outlined in Bovenberg et al.  (1998). The per unit time period vacancy cost equals 75% of
the gross wage rate. The partial price elasticity of skill types, a, is set at 1.5. The price elasticity
of export demand, C,  is set at 2.67. The calibration of the other parameters is discussed below.
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3.5 Selection strategy of firms
3.5.1 Specification of the selection strategy of firms
We assume that the productivity of a potential job-worker match in low- and high-productive
employment is match-specific. When a high-productive unemployed job-seeker or a training
program participant meets a vacancy they take a random draw from the (lognormal) productivity
distribution gh(cr),  with mean Eh. Similarly, when a low-productive unemployed job-seeker or a
relief job worker meets a vacancy they take a random draw from the (lognormal) productivity
distribution gl(a), with mean ~1. Low-productive unemployed job-seekers and relief workers
have lost part of their skills, so ~1 = w& with 0 < w < 1. We denote the wage associated with-
match-specific productivity ~j by w  (cyj>.
Firms do not accept all workers in the context of stochastic productivity and minimum wage
legislation. Denote the minimum productivity level required from a low- and high-productive
match by the firm by (Y~in I and CY~in h7 respectively (the superscript f indicates that we are
dealing with the minimum broductivity  required by the firm).
First, consider the minimum productivity required from a match with a high-productive
worker or a training program participant. The asset value of a high-productive match with
match specific productivity aj, Jh (cyj>,  satisfies
%ztJh(aj) = aj - W(Qlj) + O&,uh(Jv  - Jh(cUj)), (12)
where Jv  denotes the asset value of a vacancy. The per period return on a high-productive
worker with match specific productivity aj consists of the match-specific productivity minus the
associated wage and the capital loss associated with a separation, Jv- Jh(Qj),  which occurs at
exogenous  rate o&+h. Free entry of vacancies implies that the asset value of a vacancy equals
zero, i.e. J,=O.  The minimum productivity required from a match is the productivity level that
makes the asset value of a high-productive job zero at the minimum wage, i.e. Jh((Umin  hf )=o1
for wm, where wm denotes the minimum wage. This implies c&in h=u)m.
Next, consider the minimum productivity required from a match with a low-productive
unemployed or a relief job worker. The asset value of a low-productive match with match-
specific productivity aj,  Jl  (aj),  satisfies
%zt Jl  (aj) = aj - W(aj) + Gl,ul  (Jv - Jl(aj)) + %,eh(Jh(aj/u))  - &(aj))- (13)
Once again, the return on the job-match for the employer consists of the productivity level net of
the associated wage and the probability that the job changes state times the associated capital
gain or loss. At rate a,l ul low-productive matches are hit by an idiosyncratic shock that leads
to a separation of the worker and the firm. The associated capital loss is given by Jv-Jl(aj).
Low-productive matches become high-productive (workers regain their lost skills) at rate Tel,&.
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The associated capital gain is given by Jh( (cr& ))-J&j).  Using the free entry condition for
vacancies, Jv =O, and the condition that J&fmin J = 0 at wm, we find the minimum productivity7
required low-productive matches
a! fmin,l =wm- 7,l,eh(  Jh(akin Jw))’9 (14)
Hence, the firm will hire low-productive unemployed job-seekers and relief job workers with
match-specific productivity below the minimum wage if J&&in Jw)  > 0.12 We assume that
wages are proportional to productivity. Then, using the asset value of high-productive jobs
for Jh ( (Y;fnin l7/ w) we obtain the following expression for the minimum productivity level in
low-productive employment required by the firm
f W(rint  + &zh.uh)cl n-kin,1  =
W(rint  + %h.uh)  + %l,eh(l  - z)
wm, (15)
where g denotes the gross wage costs per productivity unit (which is determined by collective
bargaining between unions and employers’ federations, see below). As firms have to spend part of
their receipts on search costs, E < 1, the minimum productivity
job match lies below the minimum wage.13
required from a low-productive
We obtain the share of job applicants accepted by the firm by confronting the reservation
productivities with the relevant productivity distributions. The share of applicants accepted
from the pool of low-productive unemployed individuals and relief job workers, f q, is given by
1 - Gl(a~i,l). The share of applicants accepted from the pool of high-productive unemployed
and particiiants in the training program, frh, is given by 1 - f
Gh Camin,h > l
3.5.2 Calibration of the selection strategy of the firm
The calibration of the selection strategy of the firm is given in Table 5 below. The skill loss
parameter w is set so as to obtain reasonable differences in the acceptance rate of applicants
from different states by the firm. The parameter values are ‘reasonable’ because they accord
with the skill loss parameter for job search skills (discussed below). Hence, loss of skills applies
to the same extent to output-producing skills and ‘search units’-producing skills. The skill loss
parameter for job search skills is calibrated on the outflow rate from the state of low-productive
unemployment relative to the outflow rate from high-productive unemployment (see below).
12Note  that all workers with the same match-specific productivity receive the same wage, independent of their
previous state.
13Assuming that the productivity in high-productive employment lies above the minimum wage and the reser-
vation wage of a high-productive unemployed.
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Table 5: Calibration of the selection strategy of workers and firms
Parameter
E
-5.000high-skilled 0.500
low-skilled 0.600
unskilled 0.925
-5.000
-5.000
Calibrationa
w(aZin  uh)7 w(aZin  ul  el)9 9
wmin,ul  ,T Wmin,ul  ,t
high-skilled
low-skilled
unskilled
27.42
18.09
10.50 14.52 1.068 13.14 27.18
11.26 16.32 1.246 14.07 23.61
9.942 14.78 2.601 15.53 18.00
fuh fw f”T fut frh b-1
high-skilled
low-skilled
unskilled
0.984 0.931 0.902
0.992 0.949 0.940
0.998 0.783 0.599
0.578
0.563
0.091
fTT fTt fmh fm1 fmT fmt
high-skilled 0.578 0.991 0.693 0.570 0.568 0.818
low-skilled 0.563 0.987 0.763 0.556 0.555 0.837
unskilled 0.091 0.163 0.163 0.091 0.091 0.163
aReservation  wages are in thousands of Dutch guilders.
3.6 Search strategy of workers
3.6.1 Specification of the search strategy of workers
Individuals in low- and high-productive unemployment, in relief jobs and training programs
maximise their utility by varying their search effort. Before we consider the determination of
the utility maximising search strategy we define the variables that enter the respective utility
functions.
bl and bh denote (in real terms) the net benefit level in low- and high-productive unemploy-
ment, respectively. Individuals in relief jobs produce QIT  and receive WT.  Individuals in training
jobs receive wt. Define 6,  r),  T and lo as the subjective discount rate of workers, the relative
weight of income in the utility function (relative to leisure time), total time available to an
individual in a given time unit and the collectively agreed working time (‘hours’), respectively.
The parameters &h,  ~~1,  rc/T and Kt denote the utility gain or loss outside employment in the
2 3
private sector not accounted for by the difference in income or leisure time.14 Time spent on
job search by a high-productive unemployed, a relief job worker and a training program partic-
ipant is denoted by ts,h  eh,  ts, el and tst,eh,  respectively. Finally, time spent on job search by a
low-productive unemployed job seeker for a job in low-productive employment, a relief job and
placement in a training program is denoted by tsul,el,  ts,l,r  and tsul,t,  respectively.
Now that we have the elements of (dis-)utility  we consider the so-called ‘asset’ equations of
individuals in the various states. Denote the asset value of being in the state of low-productive
unemployment, high-productive unemployment, low-productive employment, high-productive
employment, a relief job or the training program by Vul,  Vuh,  Vel(aj), VY&(ctj),  Vr  and Vt,
respectively. The per period return on these assets is given by the following Bellman equations
SK21 (Qj) = qlnw(Qj)  + ln(T  - ZO)  + ~el,ul(KZ - T/eZ(Qj))
+Tel,eh(Veh(aj)  - K&j))7
W
SV&(QIj) = qlnW(aj) + ln(T - ZO)  + aeh,uh(Kh  - Kh(aj)),
6V I.41 = dn  bl + ldT  - t%l,el  - t%l,r  - t%l,t)  + 61  + G.d,el(Vel(%l,el)  - Kl)
+u,r  (VT - Kd)  + %Lz,t(vt  - Kl),
6V uh =  r)hbh  + l n ( T  - tsuh,eh)  + kh + %h,eh(T/eh(Ql,h,eh)  - vuh)
+%h,ul  (v,l  - Kh),
6V T = q  h  wT  +  ln(T  - z()  - tsTlel)  +  KT +  oT+l  ( vu1  - T/T)
(16)
(17)
(18)
and
SV t = qlnwt -k ln(T  -  lo -  tSt,eh)  -b Kt  -k at,ul(vul  -  vt)
+at  uh(Kh7 - vt>  + xt,eh(T/eh(m)  - &>, (21)
where CI,,~--- indicicates the average productivity of individuals accepted from state x in state y.
The asset equations take the familiar form where the return on the ‘asset’ equals the immediate
utility derived from the asset in the current state and the utility gains or losses when the
individual changes state times the rate at which these changes occur. Note that we assume that
working time in relief jobs, and training time in training jobs, equals the collectively agreed
working time in regular employment.
‘*The  individual may feel isolated, intruded in his or her private life by the social security office, etc.
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Job seekers maximise the asset value in a given state by varying their time spent on job
search. The search effort produced by an individual rises with time spent on job search, but is
subject to diminishing returns. Low-productive unemployed job seekers produce search effort
for a low-productive job, s~~,~L,  a relief job, ~~1,~) and placement in a training program, sUl,t,
according to
1.
Sul ,x = vultS;l,x7 X =  el,r,  t ,
with < > 1. Furthermore, vu1 denotes a parameter that reflects the relative productivity of
the group of low-productive unemployed in converting search time into search units relative
to the group of high-productive unemployed, i.e. &h is normalised to 1. The transition rate
of an individual in the state of low-productive unemployment (indexed by superscript i) to a
given state depends on the individual’s search effort for that state (indexed by superscript i>,
the average search intensity of the low-productive unemployed for that state and the average
transition rate into that state from low-productive unemployment
i 41 x
T.Ll,x = ---%.Ll,x,
%.Ll  ,x
X =  el,r,  t . (23)
Maximising utility for a given individual, and invoking the representative agent assumption (i.e.
s,l,,  = s$~, with x = el, r, t),  we obtain the following utility maximising search intensities:
Sul ,el = 4.41
[
(T - (suI,Tl4Ll)  - (S,1,tIV,1) )c c %Ll,el  (Vel  (GLl)  - Vul)  +
C + Td,el (Vel  (Gl) - Vul) 1 7 (24)
SUl ,T = hl
[
(T - (%Ll,el/4Ll) c - (sul,tlv,l>c)~ul,~(vr  - v,l>  +
c + Gd,r  (vr - Vul) 1 7 (25)
and
L
Sul ,t = Y,l
[
(T - (S,l,el/%l)c - ~Sul,rlV,l~C)~ul,t(Vt  - v.Ll>  c
5 + %l,t (vt  - KLl> 1 7 (26)
for search effort devoted to locating a vacancy in the private sector, a relief job and placement
in a training program, respectively.
In a similar way we can derive the utility maximising search effort of high-productive un-
employed job-seekers, individuals in relief jobs and individuals in the training program. Their
respective utility maximising search efforts are given by
%h,eh = vuh
Tr uh,eh(Kh(&h) - Kh)  i
c + %h,eh(&h@uh) - Kh) 1 (27)
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Sr,el  = 4-
[
(T - ~Oh,el(v,l(6)  - VT)  i
C  + P,el(Vel(~r)  - K) 1 ’
and
1.
St,eh
(T - jO)rt,eh  (Kh (Et)  - &) c
= ut c + rt,eh  (&h(6) - b) 1 ’
(28)
3.6.2 Calibration of the search strategy of workers
Table 6 below gives the calibration of the search strategy of the workers given the inputs from
the other models and parameters taken from the original MIMIC model. We set < to 2. The
instantaneous monetary compensation in relief and training jobs, wr  and wt,  equals the minimum
wage. Furthermore, individuals in relief jobs produce output equivalent to 25% of the minimum
wage.
We set the disutility parameters, &h,  ~~1,  ET  and Kt,  so as to obtain reasonable outcomes for
the reservation wages of the respective groups of job seekers (discussed below). Low-productive
individuals suffer from being outside regular employment. High-productive workers do not.15
Furthermore, we calibrate the parameter that converts search time (raised to the power l/c)
into effective search units for the low-productive unemployed, ~1,  on the technology parameter
p in the matching functions so as to let p be the same for both groups of job seekers. We set ur
equal to ul  as they have the same productivity profile. Furthermore, we set vt=O.5vl  + 0.5vh,
as only part of the individuals in the training program has regained their lost skills at any point
in time?
High-productive unemployed have a higher search intensity for regular employment than
their low-productive counterparts. Indeed, high-productive unemployed individuals are more
succesful  in converting search time into effective search units, vUh  > yzll,  whereas high-productive
unemployed do not spend time on locating relief and training jobs. The search effort of low-
productive unemployed for relief and training jobs is lower than their search effort for regular
employment. They have less to gain from moving into these programs whereas the probability
that they actually enter one of these programs is rather low. The search effort of training
program participants is lower than the search effort of high-productive unemployed. They have
to devote a substantial part of their valuable time on training. Individuals with a relief job have
the lowest search intensity. They have the least to gain from moving into regular employment
and have to devote a substantial part of their time on working.
15Note  that utility is specified in logs, so a value of -1 for the disutility parameter implies that the other elements
in the utility function are reduced by a
“Note  that the values of skill loss i n
factor 1.
. job search correspond well with the skill loss parameters in production
(see above). Hence, loss of skills affects both types of production.
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Table 6: Calibration of the search strategy of workers
Parameters and input from other submodelsa
rl T 10
high-skilled
low-skilled
unskilled
high-skilled 43.46 23.36 23.37 41.45
low-skilled 35.72 23.24 23.24 34.92
unskilled 23.23 22.12 22.12 23.23
Calibrat ion
t=uh
high-skilled
low-skilled
unskilled
0.000
0.000
0.000
Ku1 Kr
-2.000 -1.000
-2.000 -1.000
-2.000 -1.000
sul ,el Sr,el
0.632 0.380
0.684 0.418
0.809 0.312
0.000
0.000
0.000
Suh,eh
high-skilled
low-skilled
unskilled
1.030
0.989
0.888
St,eh sul ,r
0.630 0.067
0.678 0.119
0.571 0.195
bh bl Wr wt
31.12 13.75 22.51 22.51
25.14 14.73 22.51 22.51
16.52 14.74 22.51 22.51
vh Ul ur Vt
1.000 0.568 0.568 0.784
1.000 0.741 0.741 0.871
1.000 0.958 0.958 0.979
%Lz,t
0.078
0.408
0.388
aWages  and benefits are in thousands of Dutch guilders.
3.7 Selection strategy of workers
3.7.1 Specification of the selection strategy of workers
The reservation wage of a job seeker is defined as the wage for which the individual is in-
different between the job offer and the current state. First consider the reservation wage of
high-productive unemployed job-seekers and participants in training programs. Denote their
respective reservation wages by w  (aEi, Uh)  and ~(a$, &, where o$&  Uh and aKin  t denote
the corresponding minimum productivity levels (w is a superscript for Cvorkers).  Denote dis-
counted lifetime utility in high-productive employment at the reservation wage by Ve&zin  uh)>
and  Veh(a;in  t 7) for a high-productive unemployed and a training program participant, respec-
tively. By defmition  V&(c$!& uh)=Vuh7 and Ve&wmin J=Vt.9 Rewriting these conditions we find
the reservation wages
1 1
In  + - ln(T  - Zo) = -BV&,
77 v
(30)
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1 1
lnw($k&,t)  + - ln(T  - lo)  = -(bvt  - %,uh(vuh  - vt>)-
77 77
Now consider the reservation wage of individuals in relief jobs W(QI$~  T).  The reservation9
wage follows from Vel (aKin  T, )=I& Rewriting this condition we obtain the reservation wage
1
In W(Q’zin,r>  + - ln(T  - lo)
1
=
r7
-(sV,  - ~d,Ul(Kl  - K)
77
-~el,eh(Veh(~~i,,,/~)  - r/r))
1
’ + aeh)uh--
77  6  + aeh,uh  + rel,eh
((6  + rel,eh)T/r
-~el,ul(K.d  - VT)
+
Tel  , e h
6  + aeh,uh
W nw - aeh,uhkh)) (32)
Note that the possibility to become high-productive again lowers the reservation wage of relief
job workers. Furthermore, note that the reservation wage rises in w, the skill-loss parameter. A
higher w implies that the productivity of low-productive workers is closer to the productivity
of high-productive workers. Consequently, a low-productive individual has less to gain from a
transition into the state of high-productive employment.
Finally, consider the reservation wage of a low-productive unemployed for the different states.
The low-productive unemployed holds a different reservation wage for low-productive employ-
ment, relief jobs and placement in a training program because the exit routes from (and disu-
tilities in) these states differs. Denote the reservation wage and the corresponding minimum
productivity level relevant for low-productive employment by w(aW,in  u1  el).  The reservation7 >
wage for low-productive employment follows from Vel (CY"min  ul el) = Vu1> 7
1
In  w(aZ.in,ul,el)  + - ln(T  - lo)
1
=
77
-(s’l/ul  - rel,eh(Veh(a$n,ul,el/W)  - J&l))
rl
1- ’ + aeh7uh-
6 6  + aeh,uh  + rel,eh
((6  + rel,&)T/,l
+
Tel  , e h
6  + aeh,uh
W n  w - oeh,uhKh))- ( 3 3 )
Like for a relief job worker, the reservation wage is reduced by the possibility to become high-
productive again, and rises when there are less skills to (re)gain.
In a similar way derive the reservation wages for relief and training jobs. However, we only
derive these reservation wages to ensure that compensation exceeds the reservation wage for
relief and training jobs. Their derivation can be found in Jongen et  al.  (2000).
Now that we have all the reservation wages we can determine how many job offers are
accepted by the respective groups of job seekers. As mentioned before, wages are proportional to
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productivity. This implies that the minimum productivity levels associated with the reservation
wages for employment in the private sector are given by
QKin  x =
wk#li?l,x)  -
 177 = uh, ul, r, t.9
u)(ct’X>
(34)
where w(ax)  denotes the respective average wage of accepted job offers of the respective group.
The share of job offers acceptable to the respective job-seekers, fu, with x = I,  h, r, t, is then
given bY f ul=l-Gl(~~i, 211  el) 7 f Uh=‘-Gh(QEin  Uh)  7 f u~=l-G~(~~in,~)  and f U~=l-Gh(Cr~i,,t).7 7 7
3.7.2 Calibration of selection strategy of workers
Table 5 above gives the resulting outcomes for the reservation wages and the acceptance rates
of the various groups of job seekers in the calibrated model. The reservation wage rises with the
level of education, as the compensation outside employment rises with the level of education.
Furthermore, we find that the reservation wage of the low-productive unemployed for a regular
job lies substantially below the reservation wage of the high-productive unemployed for a regular
job. Relief jobs do not offer the opportunity to regain lost skills, whereas training jobs do.
This explains why the reservation wage for training jobs lies far below the reservation wage
for relief jobs. The reservation wage of participants in relief jobs lies substantially below the
reservation wage of participants in training jobs as they are less likely to obtain alternative
regular employment, and are willing to trade a lower paying job now for the option to become
high-productive again.
The acceptance rates of the various groups of job seekers for regular jobs reflects the dif-
ferences in reservation wages and the potential wage distribution. Low-productive unemployed
accept more job-offers than high-productive unemployed. Training job participants are also
quite willing to accept a job, the unskilled training participants being the notable exception.
The relief job workers are more choosy than the low-productive unemployed, they have less to
gain from a move into regular employment.
3.8 Share of job-worker contacts accepted
3.8.1 Specification of the share of job-worker contacts accepted
Both the firm and the job seeker hold a minimum productivity standard. Since workers are
homogeneous ex  ante, they hold the same minimum productivity standard. Firms do the same.
This would imply that the ‘short-side of the market’ determines the actual share of contacts
that results in match, i.e. f ml = min{ f ul,  f rl}  etc. However, to capture some heterogeneity in
reservation wages within a certain group we assume that the actual share of contact that results
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in a match is given by a CES function. For the respective groups we have
f mx = ((fuxY  + (frx)$ ? x 6 {UheW, (4 el}, {r, el),  {t, eh},
where 6 denotes the CES-parameter.
3.8.2 Calibration of the share of job-workers contacts accepted
The resulting overall acceptance rates for job-worker contacts in the calibrated model are given
in Table 5 above. For all skill levels the low-productive unemployed and relief job workers are
more restricted by the minimum wage than by their reservation wage. The same holds for the
unskilled high-productive unemployed and training program participants. High- and low-skilled
high-productive unemployed and training program participants are more likely to be restricted
by their reservation wage.
Moving down the table to the overall acceptance rate, we observe the negative effect of the
loss of skills. Despite the fact that low-productive job seekers are quite willing to accept a
lower wage, they are still less likely to fill a vacant job, due to the presence of minimum wages.
Furthermore, note that the unskilled suffer more from the presence of minimum wages than the
low- and high-skilled, given their low productivity profile.
3.9 Wage determination
The determination of wages is quite similar to the original MIMIC model. In Bovenberg et al.
(1998), wages per productivity unit are a mark-up on the outside option of workers, determined
by bargaining between unions and employers’ federations. We adjust the outside option of
the union to take into account the distinct states of high- and low-productive unemployment,
and relief and training jobs. Furthermore, we assume that wages only depend on skill specific
variables, and not on aggregate variables (as opposed to the original MIMIC model).
Compensation outside current employment depends on the distribution over the states ac-
cording to the shares of these states in the labour market and their compensation levels. Hence,
the ‘fall-back’ compensation, w* (the superscript o indicates the outside option), is given by a
weighted sum of compensation outside current matches
W* = (l- (uh +&& i-r +t)))m+uhbh  +&(ulbl i-rwr +tw& (36)
where W denotes the average wage in regular employment. We introduce a parameter 6, so as
to discount the difference between income in low-productive unemployment, relief and training
jobs and private sector employment. Empirical studies for The Netherlands suggest that low-
productive unemploymenP generates the same downward pressure on wages as high-productive
17Actually, these studies use long-term unemployment, a proxy for our pool of low-productive unemployed.
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unemployment (see e.g. Jongen and Graafland (1998)). H ence, we discount, the d#erence
between income in low-productive unemployment and formal employment by a factor S, which
effectively brings bl in line with bh. Using our data on welfare benefits and unemployment
insurance benefits, we come to a value of .45 for 6,.
ALMPs will affect the ‘fall-back’ position of the union directly when their compensation level
differs from the benefit level in low-productive unemployment, and indirectly via their impact
on the distribution of individuals over the different states.
All parameters in the wage bargaining model, except 6,, are taken from the original MIMIC
model (see Bovenberg et al. (1998)).
3.10  Government budget
Finally, we consider government expenditures and receipts. The government budget,  G%, is
given by
GB = tasii?Ep,  -  wpsEps  -  bhUh  -  blUl  -  w,R  - wtT
-cw,‘I/,  -  cw&  - Aps, (37)
where tas denotes the average tax rate, and Epr denotes private sector employment. The
government receives taxes but has to pay (net) wages to workers in the public sector18, wpsEps,
benefits to unemployed (note that benefits are expressed net of taxes), payments to relief and
training job workers and search costs for attracting relief and training job workers (note that
we assume that search costs per vacancy for relief and training jobs per period are a fraction of
compensation in these programs, like in the private sector). A,, denotes autonomous government
consumption. We set A,, so as to have a balanced budget in our base projection, using the actual
average tax rate in 1993.
4 Simulations
First we consider simulations where we increase the number of vacancies posted for relief and
training jobs, and employment subsidies for individuals in low-productive employment. We
present simulation results for an equal ‘ex ante’ impuls of 115 million euro (approximately 250
million Dutch guilders) in 1999 and subsequent periods for the three programs. By ‘ex ante’ we
mean that we change the number of vacancies for relief jobs, training jobs or the level of the
employment subsidy so as to let the immediate impact on expenditures on participants equal
115 million euro, i.e. without taking into account the induced changes in behaviour and stocks.
The discussion of the simulation outcomes is structured as follows: i) first we consider the
micro level, i.e. the induced changes in behaviour; ii) then we consider how these behavioural
18Public sector wages are indexed to private sector wages.
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changes are reflected in some macro-economic variables, and finally; iii) we consider the impact
on government expenditures. For the macro-economic variables and government expenditures
we give the results both with and without compensating taxation.
4.1 Relief jobs
First consider the impact of increasing vacancies for relief jobs. Table 7 below gives the induced
changes in the behaviour of workers and firms. As more vacancies for relief jobs come into
the market, individuals in low- productive unemployment devote more time to locating these
vacancies. lg This goes at the expense of time devoted to locating private sector vacancies and
vacancies for training jobs. 2o The acceptance rates of workers hardly change, the changes mainly
reflect composition effects of skill types.21
Turning to the firms’ side, we observe that more vacancies for relief jobs partly crowd out
private sector vacancies. As noted in the calibration, it is optimal for participants in the relief
program to search less intensely for regular employment than their low-productive unemployed
counterparts. Hence, when participation in the relief program increases, the effective supply of
labour falls. Hence, search costs for firms rise. In addition, as we will see below, wages rise as
well. As both wage and search costs rise, firms close down part of their vacancies.22
The acceptance rate of the firm of the different groups hardly changes, differences are mostly
due to changes in the skill-composition of the pools of job seekers.23 The overall acceptance
rates also harldy change, as the acceptance rates of workers and firms hardly change.
Next, consider how these changes in the ‘inputs’ of the matching process affect the endoge-
nous flow rates and stocks. Obviously, the flow rate from low-productive unemployment into
relief jobs increases. Individuals in low-productive unemployment spend less time on locating
vacancies in the private sector. Consequently, their flow rate into regular employment falls.
Individuals in the training program and high-productive unemployment face less competition
from individuals in the relief program than individuals in low-productive unemployment. Hence,
they are more likely to encounter a vacant job slot.
Turning to the stocks, participation in relief jobs rises and low-productive unemployment
lgSee equations (3) and (23). More vacancies for relief jobs raise the flow rate into relief jobs. The individual
search effort for relief jobs depends positively on the flow rate into relief jobs.
201ndividuals in relief jobs also increase their search effort. Low-productive employment becomes more attractive
for them. Indeed, more vacancies for relief jobs makes the state of low-productive unemployment more attractive,
reducing the costs associated with job loss in low-productive employment.
21Noteworthy  is the increase in the acceptance rate of relief job workers. As mentioned above, low-productive
employment at a given wage becomes more attractive for relief job workers. The reduced costs of job loss in
low-productive employment lowers their reservation wage.
22The fall in vacancies is somewhat masked by the rise in the average duration of vacancies.
23This also explains the diverging effects on the acceptance rates of the low-productive unemployed vs. relief
job workers.
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falls. Less individuals move into the training program. High-productive unemployment falls as
well. As relief jobs reduce private sector employment (see below), they reduce the inflow into
high-productive unemployment. Note that the rise in the stock of relief job participants is much
larger than the fall in low-productive unemployment. This reflects the effect that individuals ‘get
stuck’ in the relief program, with a reduced outflow into regular employment.
Table 8 below gives the impact of an increase in relief jobs on some key macro-economic
variables and government expenditures, with and without compensating taxation. First consider
the impact on some aggregate price levels in the economy. As individuals prefer to be in the
state of relief jobs relative to the state of low-productive unemployment, the outside option
of workers in the wage bargain goes up. This raises labour costs. Productivity rises as less
individuals in the low-productive segment are in employment. The rise in labour costs leads to
a rise in production and consumption prices.24
Moving down the table, we find that private sector employment and production are adversely
affected by the rise in labour costs. Relief jobs partly crowd out regular employment, leaving a
net positive effect on total employment (including relief and training jobs). The unemployment
rate falls as individuals move into relief jobs. However, the ‘inactivity rate’ (defined as the stocks
of unemployment, relief jobs and training jobs over the labour force) rises.
Turning to the receipts and expenditures of the government, the wage bill of the government
rises. This is mostly due to the rise in relief job expenditures (the remainder is due to the
rise in average labour costs for the government (wages in the public sector are linked to the
private sector)). Note that the rise in the wage bill for relief jobs is lower ‘ex post’ than
‘ex ante’, as individuals in relief jobs produce part of their compensation.25  Unemployment
insurance expenditures and welfare benefits fall. Tax receipts fall with the fall in private sector
employment. Overall, expenditures rise by less than the ‘ex ante’ expenditures.
Table 8 also gives the corresponding effects on the macro level and government expenditures
when the government finances the rise in expenditures by increasing income tax rates. The rise
in income tax rates, the ‘additional burden’ is reflected in the rise of the average burden. This
raises labour costs, and hence production and consumption prices. With compensating taxation,
relief jobs crowd out more private sector employment and production.
4.2 Training jobs
prices rise less than average labour costs due to changes in the skill-composition of the labour
inputs. Consumption prices rise less than production prices as part of the consumption bundle is imported.
25Search  costs hardly rise, the average vacancy duration is very low for vacancies for relief and training jobs.
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Table 7: Relief jobs, training jobs and vouchers - changes in behaviour, flows and stocksa
Simulation relief t raining voucherb relief t raining vouche@
Individual level
Job-seekers
Search intensity
Suh,eh
Sul,el
Sul ,r
su1,t
sr,e1
St,eh
pert.  changes pert.  changes
-0.10 -1.91 -1.74
-1.20 -10.8 2.98
36.4 -10.8 -6.44
-0.09 45.8 -4.10
0.84 -2.73 10.8
-0.03 -3.81 -3.50
Acceptance rate
fuh -0.33 -0.55 -1.08
fu1 -0.05 -0.34 -0.29
fur 0.71 1.95 2.49
fut -0.33 -1.09 -2.03
Firms
Vacancies
VPr -0.50 -6.64 -3.12
v7 125. 0.00 0.00
vt 0.00 210. 0.00
Acceptance rate
frh 0.18 -0.90 -0.98
fr1 0.25 0.99 11.4
frr 0.55 -3.92 19.2
frt 0.31 -1.67 -1.66
Aggregate level
Overall accept. rates
fmh
fn-4
fmr
fmt
Flow rates
ruh,eh 0.16 -4.31 -3.92
clrul  ,el -0.65 -11.3 13.7
Tul ,T 93.3 1.78 2.39
*u1,t 2.27 154. 3.11
xr,e1 1.19 -7.85 23.7
rt,eh 0.64 -9.21 -6.52
Stocks abs. changes
Uh -0.51 8.87 5.76
Ul -5.95 -18.7 -10.3
R 13.7 -0.74 -2.77
T -0.19 14.4 0.12
Uh+&+R+T 7.03 3.76 -7.18
0.02 -1.05 -1.30
0.25 1.00 10.8
0.56 -3.84 18.3
0.26 -1.76 -1.68
aOutcomes  denote differences between the simulation and the base projection, no compensating taxation.
bSubsidy  equals 7% of the net benefit level in low-productive unemployment.
Table 8: Relief jobs, training jobs and vouchers - macro-ec. variables and gov. exp?
Simulation
no compensating taxation with compensating taxation
relief training vouche@ relief t raining voucherb
Prices
Labour costC
Labour productivity
Production price
Consumption price
Volumes
Productior@
Employment  (total)e
Employment  (firms)e
Ratio’s
Unemployment  rate
- incl.  r and tf
Tax burden
- additional burden
Government budget
Expenditures9
Wage bill
- relief jobs
- training jobs
Unemployment  insuranceh
Welfare benefitsh
Voucher expenditures
Receip  ts9
Taxes
Gov. budget
Ex ante expendituresi
pert.  changes
0.12 0.13
0.04 0.08
0.07 0.00
0.05 0.00
-0.11 0.00
0.12 0.19
-0.15 -0.08
abs. changes
-0.11 -0.17
0.12 0.07
0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00
0.11 0.19 -0.03 0.13 0.20 -0.02
0.10 0.00 -0.02 0.11 0.00 -0.02
0.00 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00
0.00 0.09 0.06 0.00 0.10 0.06
-0.04 -0.12 -0.07 -0.03 -0.11 -0.06
0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.12
-0.02 0.04
-0.10 -0.13
0.12 0.12
-0.08 0.15
-0.06 0.04
-0.06 0.11
-0.05 0.08
0.09 -0.16
0.09 0.09
0.16 -0.20
-0.08 -0.08
-0.13 0.16
-0.08 0.07
0.00 0.07
0.05
-0.04
0.12
0.10
0.00
0.12
pert.  changes
0.18
0.07
0.05
0.04
-0.07
0.14
-0.15
abs. changes
-0.13
0.12
0.10
0.10
0.20
0.00
0.12
-0.06
-0.06
-0.05
-0.04
0.07
0.07
0.14
-0.07
-0.11
-0.05
0.03
0.10
0.00
0.12
aOutcomes  denote differences between the simulation and the base projection.
bSubsidy  qe uals 7% of the net benefit level in low-productive unemployment.
‘Gross labour cost per unit of labour, excluding search costs.
dProductio n in the private sector.
eTotal  employment includes relief and training jobs, employment by firms denotes private sector employment.
fThe stock of unemployment plus the stocks of relief and training participants divided by the labour force.
9Expenditures  in billions of euro.
h High-produ ctive  un. individuals receive unemployment insurance, low-productive un. receive welfare benefits.
2Expenditures  ceteris paribus, i.e. disregarding behavioural changes.
devoted to locating vacancies in the private sector. The acceptance rates of the various groups
of job seekers for private job offers is hardly affected by the rise in training job participation,
the changes mainly reflect changes in the skill-composition of the various pools.
Trained individuals are more attractive for firms than low-productive unemployed. Further-
rnore, as individuals in training jobs search more intensely for jobs, the average vacancy duration
falls. Firms respond by posting more vacancies, ceteris paribus. However, the rise in vacancies
is limited by the rise in wages (see below). Note that vacancies for training jobs rise more in
percentage terms than for relief jobs, for the same ‘ex ante’ impuls. This is due to the lower av-
erage duration in the state of training jobs, which implies more vacancies for the same ‘ex ante’
rise in participation. The acceptance rates of firms are hardly affected. The overall acceptance
rates hardly change either.
Turning to the flow rates and stocks. The flow rate into the training program rises. The other
flow rates are hardly affected. The stock of participants in the training program rises. Low-
productive unemployment falls. Note that the fall in low-productive unemployment is larger than
the rise in the participation in the training program. The training program speeds up the process
by which job seekers find regular employment. High-productive unemployment rises as more
individuals flow into this state from the training program and regular employment. Despite
the positive ‘treatment effect’ in the training program, i.e. a higher flow rate into regular
employment, the number of individuals outside regular employment rises. This is due to the rise
in wages (see below), which crowds out part of private sector employment.
Table 8 gives the resulting changes in some macro-economic variables, and government ex-
penditures. Regarding price levels, wages rise with the increase in training jobs. The rise in
wages is partly due to the increase in average productivity and partly due to the more favourable
outside option of workers. Production and consumption prices are harldy affected despite the
rise in wages, due to lower search costs.
Private sector employment falls as labour costs rise. However, production is unaffected due
to the rise labour productivity. Total employment rises, as the rise in participation in the
training program dominates the fall  in regular employment. Unemployment falls.  However, the
‘inactivity ratio’ (the stocks of unemployment, relief and training jobs over the labour force)
increases.
Government expenditures rise due to the higher expenditures on the training program. Ex-
penditures on unemployment insurance benefits rise with high-productive unemployment. How-
ever, the government saves on welfare benefits, relief jobs expenditures and receives more taxes
due to the rise in wages. Overall, expenditures fall short of receipts, but more than the ‘ex ante’
expenditures. Expenditures are higher ‘ex post’ due to the training costs (25% of the minimum
wage per participant per period).
Table 8 also gives the corresponding changes in macro-economic variables and government
36
expenditures and receipts when we finance the rise in the deficit with higher income tax rates.
The average burden rises, see the ‘additional burden’. With compensating taxation production
prices and consumption prices rise. Consequently, production falls, and private sector employ-
ment falls m o r e than without compensating taxation.
4.3 Vouchers
We further consider the impact of a uniform subsidy for the employer for each low-productive
worker (‘vouchers’). With the uniform subsidy, the minimum productivity standard of the firm
for individuals from the state of low-productive unemployment and relief jobs becomes
a f W(rint  + aeh.uh)min,l  =
‘+int +  oeh.uh) +  %l,eh(l - g)
(wm- 4’ (38)
where v denotes the level of the subsidy the employer receives per unit time period. Why do we
consider a subsidy for the employer and not for the unemployed? In the calibrated model the
minimum wage is more restrictive than the reservation wage of the low-productive unemployed.
Hence, the firm and the worker will agree to leave all of the subsidy to the firm as long the
productivity falls short of the minimum wage. For productivity levels (including the subsidy)
above the minimum wage, workers and firms bargain over the additional surplus.  The additional
surplus is split 50/50 on average.
We consider the impact of an ‘ex ante’ impuls of 115 million euro on the voucher program.
The corresponding subsidy level is 7% of the net benefit level of low-productive unemployed.
Table 7 gives the resulting changes in behaviour. As the subsidy mainly affects firm be-
is best to starthaviour 7 it
productive .Job seekers
with the firm’s side of
significantly. The fallrise in search costs leads to a rise in vacancies
the market. The acceptance rates for low-
posted, ceteris paribus. However, the rise in vacancies posted is dominated by the fall in the
average duration of vacancies.
Turning to the workers side, as more workers from the pools of low-productive unemployment
and relief jobs are accepted by firms, individuals in these states spend more time on locating
private sector vacancies. The search effort for relief and training jobs falls as time is reallocated to
search effort for regular employment. High-productive unemployed and training job workers face
tougher competition from individuals in low-productive unemployment and relief jobs. Hence,
they are less likely to locate a vacancy. They reduce their search effort. The acceptance rates of
workers are hardly affected. The overall acceptance rates relevant for low-productive unemployed
and relief job workers rises in line with the rise in the acceptance rate of the firm. The overall
acceptance rates relevant for high-productive unemployed and training program participants
hardly change.
Now consider the changes in the stocks and flow rates. More individuals flow from low-
productive unemployment and the relief program into regular employment. The flow rates for
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high-productive unemployment and the training program fall due to the increase in competition.
The stocks of low-productive unemployment and relief jobs fall .  Due to the lower outflow high-
productive unemployment and participation in the training program rise.
In Table 8 we report the changes in some macro-economic variables and goverment expen-
ditures. Labour costs fall due to the subsidy. However, labour productivity falls by more than
labour costs, showing a slight increase in wage pressure. Production and consumption prices fall
in line with labour costs.
Private sector production and employment rise. Note that the rise in production is less
than the rise in employment, due to the lower productivity of the workers that are drawn into
employment by the subsidy. Total employment rises by less than private sector employment, as
participation in the relief program falls. The unemployment rate falls as more individuals flow
from low-productive unemployment into regular employment. The fall in the ‘inactivity rate’ is
more pronounced, due to the fall in participation in the relief program. We include the subsidy
in the ‘wedge’ between labour costs and net wages. The subsidy leads to a fall in the average
(tax) burden.
Turning to the effects on government expenditures, the wage bill falls. Furthermore, the
government saves on welfare benefits. However, this effect is nullified by an equivalent rise in
unemployment insurance benefits. Subsidy expenditures rise slightly above the level expected
‘ex ante’ as more individuals are drawn into low-productive employment. Tax receipts rise with
the rise in production. Savings on wages by the government and additional tax receipts lead to
an ‘ex post’ deficit that is only approximately one third of the ‘ex ante’ expenditures.
Table 8 also gives the corresponding changes with compensating taxation. The rise (fall) in
private sector employment (unemployment and inactivity) and production is somewhat limited
by the rise in taxes.
4.4 Relief jobs, training jobs and vouchers - a comparison
How do the different programs affect our model economy relative to one another? For the same
‘ex ante’ level of expenditures, relief and training jobs are more effective in reducing unemploy-
ment than ‘vouchers’ for the low-productive unemployed, especially when we do not compensate
the additional expenditures by higher income tax rates. However, relief and training jobs crowd
out private sector employment, whereas ‘vouchers’ do not.  Indeed, the most detrimental to pri-
vate sector employment is the rise in relief jobs. Individuals ‘get stuck’ in relief jobs, and reduce
their search effort for regular employment. The training program has the opposite effect on the
effective supply of labour. The positive ‘treatment effect’ increases the flow rate into regular
employment. However, the induced fall  in search costs is dominated by the rise in wages due to
the more favourable outside option of workers. This leaves a negative net effect on private sector
employment. The effect of subsidies targeted at low-productive workers is in some ways similar
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to the training program. More individuals are drawn into low-productive employment which is
another route through which individuals may regain their lost skills.  However, in the calibrated
model, the rate at which individuals regain their lost skills in low-productive employment is
less than the rate at which individuals move from the training program into high-productive
employment (the rate at which they ‘regain’ their lost skills). Still, the effect of ‘vouchers’ on
private sector employment is much more positive than for the training program. Individuals pro-
duce output right from the start when they enter low-productive employment with the subsidy,
and the rise in wages is limited as the subsidy is only a fraction of the compensation in low-
productive employment. Furthermore, part of the subsidy goes to the employer, which leads to
an overall reduction in labour costs. Overall, the training program is most effective in reducing
(‘open’) unemployment, but the voucher program is most effective in reducing ‘inactivity’ (the
sum of unemployment, relief job participants and training program participants) and enhancing
production.
4.5 Design features relief and training jobs
We now consider the impact of changing some design features of the relief and training program.
Over the past few years the compensation in training and particularly relief jobs has increased,
from 100 percent of the minimum wage level to (approximately) 115 percent of the minimum
wage level. We consider the impact of raising the compensation level in relief and training jobs
to 115 and 150 percent. Furthermore, contract durations have become more limited. Hence, we
consider the impact of a doubling of the firing rates from the relief and training program back
into low-productive unemployment.
Tables 9 and 10 give the resulting changes in behaviour, the flows and stocks and some
macro-economic variables and government expenditures, respectively. First consider the induced
changes in behaviour from increasing the compensation level in relief and training jobs. The
higher compensation level induces low-productive individuals to search more actively for relief
and training jobs. The rise in the search time devoted to locating relief and training job vacancies
goes at the expense of search time devoted to locating regular vacancies. As individuals in the
relief and training program, particularly the relief program, have less to gain from moving into
regular employment, they reduce their search effort for regular employment. The acceptance
rates of workers in the relief and training program falls. They become more choosy with their
more favourable current compensation level. Firms close down part of their vacancies.
Individuals in relief and training jobs reduce their search effort for regular jobs. Furthermore, the
rise in the compensation in relief and training jobs puts upward pressure on wages, increasing
labour costs even further. The changes in the acceptance rates of firms towards the various
groups of job seekers mainly reflects changes in the skill composition of the various pools. The
overall acceptance rates for regular employment relevant for relief and training job participants
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Table 9: Design features - changes in behaviour, flows and stock?
Simulation
w&w w-&w G,Ul ot $1 w&w w&w +,IL1 ~t,u1
+15% +50% +100% +100% +15% +50% +100% +100%
Individual level
Job-seekers
Search intensity
Suh,eh
Sul ,el
%Ll,l-
Su1,t
Sr,el
St,eh
Acceptance rate
bb
0
fuh 0.21 1.58 0.07 -0.03 Tul ,r 4.61 5.01 -3.69 -0.96
fw 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.03 Td,t -0.86 -7.57 -0.70 -4.26
fur -30.2 -67.1 8.93 -0.33 xr,el -27.1 -73.2 10.8 1.47
fut -9.92 -32.5 0.02 18.2 rt,eh -10.3 -43.9 -0.33 18.7
Firms
Vacancies
V
Vr
vt
Acceptance rate
frh 0.21 1.02 -0.09 0.15
fr1 -0.96 -5.07 -0.22 -0.19
frr -6.66 -7.49 6.52 0.42
frt -1.51 -8.43 -0.24 4.38
-0.05 -0.07 0.00 0.20
-0.89 -2.71 0.29 1.61
19.4 54.3 -8.51 0.75
3.00 8.19 0.02 -8.81
-28.4 -74.7 10.2 0.48
-9.13 -37.9 -0.07 15.6
-1.48 -6.59 0.32 1.38
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Aggregate level
pert.  changes pew.  changes
aOutcomes  denote differences between the simulation and the base projection, no compensating taxation.
Overall accept. rate
fmh
fmr
fmr
fmt
Flow rates
nuh,eh -0.37 -1.96 -0.09 0.58
Tul ,el -2.14 -9.84 0.10 1.97
Stocks
uh
Ul
R
T
uh+&+R+T
0.36 2.01 -0.07 0.10
-0.93 -4.93 -0.22 -0.19
-7.01 -31.9 6.57 0.40
-2.62 -15.0 -0.24 6.21
0.15 0.80 0.23 -1.28
4.45 26.6 1.85 3.39
5.08 22.7 -4.87 0.01
0.98 5.45 0.07 -3.31
10.7 55.5 -2.72 -1.18
abs. changes
Table 10: Design features - macro-economic variables and gov. expenditures’
no compensating taxation with compensating taxation
Simulation w-&w w&w G,Ul Q ,ul w&w w&w +y.Ll ot  ,ul
+15% +50% +100% +100% +15% +50% +100% +lOO%
pert.  changes
0.98 -0.05
0.34 -0.02
0.59 -0.03
0.44 -0.02
per-c.  changes
1.41 -0.06
0.30 -0.02
1.00 -0.04
0.75 -0.03
Prices
Labour costb
Labour productivity
Production price
Consumption price
Volumes
ProductionC
Employment  (total)d
Employment ( firms)d
Ratio’s
Unemployment  rate
- incl.  r and te
Government budget
Expendituresf
Wage bill
- relief jobs
- training jobs
Unemployment insurance9
Welfare benefits9
Receip  tsf
Taxes
Net receipts
-0.04
-0.02
-0.02
-0.01
0.19
0.06
0.11
0.08
-0.03 0.26
-0.02 0.06
0.00 0.18
0.00 0.13
-0.17
-0.09
-0.23
-0.87 0.04
-0.51 -0.04
-1.20 0.06
abs. changes
0.48 0.04
0.98 -0.05
0.01 -0.26
-0.04 -0.16
0.03 -0.32
-1.47 0.06
-0.93 -0.03
-1.77 0.08
abs. changes
0.88 0.02
1.44 -0.06
0.02
-0.03
0.04
0.03
-0.03
0.08
0.19
0.04 0.15
-0.02 0.26
0.11 0.58 -0.04 -0.05 0.13 0.72 -0.05 -0.05
0.06 0.33 -0.04 0.00 0.07 0.36 -0.04 0.00
0.04 0.17 0.00 -0.04 0.04 0.19 0.00 -0.04
0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.06 0.00 -0.01
0.03 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.30 0.01 0.02
-0.12 0.00
0.93 0.03
-0.02
-0.17
0.00
0.03
0.20
0.00
1.09 -0.04
0.00 0.00
-0.05
0.00
aOutcomes  denote differences between the simulation and the base projection.
‘Gross labour cost per unit of labour, excluding search costs.
CProduction  in the private sector.
dTotal  employment includes relief and training jobs, employment by firms denotes private sector employment.
eThe  stock of unemployment plus the stocks of relief and training participants divided by the labour force.
f Expenditures in billions of euro.
9High-productive  un. individuals receive unemployment insurance, individuals in low-productive un. receive welfare benefits.
falls.
We observe the rise in the flow rate into relief and training jobs, and the reduced flow rates
from these states into regular employment. The high-productive unemployed suffer from the
crowding out of private sector employment.
The stocks of relief and training jobs rise. Higher compensation in these programs increases
the inflow and reduces the outflow. Low- and high-productive unemployment rise as well, due
to the crowding out of private sector employment.
Table 10 gives the changes in some macro-economic variables and government expenditures.
Higher wage and search costs increase labour costs. Labour productivity rises, as less individuals
flow into low-productive employment. Production and consumption prices rise in line with labour
costs. The rise in labour costs adversely affects private sector employment and production. Total
employment falls, as the rise in participation in relief and training jobs is dominated by the fall
in private sector employment. As noted above, the unemployment and ‘inactivity’ rate increase.
Government expenditures rise due to higher wages, more transfers and lower tax receipts. With
compensating taxation private sector employment and production are more adversely affected.
Tables 9 and 10 also report the effects of doubling the quit rate from relief and training jobs
back into the state of low-productive unemployment. For individuals outside relief and training
jobs a higher quit rate is just like a decrease in the number of vacancies for relief and training
jobs, respectively. Hence, qualitatively, the results are the mirror image of an increase in the
number of vacancies of relief and training jobs already reported. Hence, we shall only highlight
the differences between a reduction in the number of vacancies for relief and training jobs, and
increasing the quit rate from these jobs to low-productive unemployment.
The main difference is on the search behaviour of individuals in relief and training jobs. As
they are more likely to be sent back to low-productive unemployment in the state of relief and
training jobs, they increase their search effort for locating private sector vacancies. Furthermore,
they become less choosy towards job offers, their acceptance rates rise.
Reducing the contract durations in relief and training jobs has a positive effect on private
sector employment and government expenditures (less expenditures). However, the positive
effect is more limited for training jobs as more individuals re-enter the pool of low-productive
unemployment, potentially before they complete their training.
5 Sensitivity analysis
In this section we consider how sensitive the simulation results are to assumptions for which we
have a weak empirical basis. Due to a lack of space, and not to exhaust the reader, we limit the
discussion to the macro-economic variables and government expenditures.
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51. Production and supervision costs
In our baseline simulations we assume that production by relief workers equals 25 percent of
their compensation level. Furthermore, in our baseline simulations we assume that there are no
supervision costs for the relief and training programs. Table 11 gives the outcomes of the changes
in some macro-economic variables and government expenditures when we assume, respectively,
that: i) supervision costs in relief jobs equal 100 percent of the minimum wage, per participant;
ii) supervision costs in training jobs equal 100 percent of the minimum wage, per participant
and; iii) production in relief jobs equals the minimum wage (the compensation of participants)
for relief jobs, per participant.
First consider cases i) and ii). Expenditures on these programs rise when we assume su-
pervision costs. Expenditures approximately double. Income tax rates have to rise more than
without the additional supervision costs. Consequently, regular employment and production fall
bv more.
Now consider the case where production by relief job workers equals their compensation,
case iii). 26 Effectively 7 this makes the relief program virtually costless to the government, as
participants receive as much as they produce. We are left with feedback effects when we raise
the number of relief jobs. The rise in wages in the private sector induced by the more favourable
outside option of workers, and reduced tax receipts, bite a significant piece out of the savings
on benefits. Overall, additional receipts just exceed additional expenditures. The effects on
the private sector are virtually the same as in the baseline simulations without compensating
taxation. The main difference lies in the effects with compensating taxation.
5.2 Discounting the states of low-productive unemployment, relief and train-
ing jobs
In line with empirical findings, we discount the loss of income in the state of low-productive
unemployment with a factor S, (see eq.(36)).  We further assume that the same discounting
holds for the lower income in relief and training jobs, as only the low-productive unemployed
are eligible for these programs.
Below we consider how the results change if we discount the loss of income in the states of
low-productive unemployment, relief and training jobs by more, S, = 0.3, and less, S, = 0.6.
The resulting simulation outcomes are given in Table 12. First consider the case where the states
of low-productive unemployment, relief and training jobs are discounted more heavily, S, = 0.3.
With more discounting, the rise in the fall-back position of workers in the wage bargain is less
pronounced. Production and consumption prices still rise when we increase relief jobs, but fall
26We  only consider this case for relief jobs, as we regard it as unlikely that production in training jobs is
substantial.
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Table 11: Sensitivity analysis production and supervision costs, 115 million ex ante’
Simulation
no compensating taxation with compensating taxation
supervision supervision production supervision supervision production
cost r = cost t = r= cost r = cost t = r=
min. wage min. wage min. wage min. wage min. wage min. wage
Prices pert.  changes pert.  changes
Labour costb 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.21 0.24
Labour productivity 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.07
Production price 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.16 0.11
Consumption price 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.12 0.08
Volumes
ProductionC -0.11 0.00 -0.11 -0.25 -0.16
Employment  (total)d 0.12 0.19 0.12 0.03 0.08
Employment  (firms)d -0.15 -0.08 -0.15 -0.28 -0.22
Ratio’s abs. changes abs. changes
Unemployment  rate -0.11 -0.17 -0.11 -0.03 -0.07
- incl.  r and te 0.12 0.07 0.12 0.22 0.18
Government budget
Expendituresf
Wage bill 0.25 0.34 0.01 0.29 0.37
- relief jobs 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.00
- training jobs 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.34
Unemployment insurances 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.10
Welfare benefits9 0.04 -0.12 -0.04 -0.01 -0.10
Receip  tsf
Taxes 0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.28 0.39
Net receipts 0.24 -0.28 0.01 0.00 0.00
aOutcomes  denote differences between the simulation and the base projection.
bGross  labour cost per unit of labour, excluding search costs.
CProduction  in the private sector.
‘Total employment includes relief and training jobs, employment by firms denotes private sector employment.
eThe  stock of unemployment plus the stocks of relief and training participants divided by the labour force.
f Expenditures in billions of euro.
gHigh-productive  un. individuals receive unemployment insurance, low-productive un. receive welfare benefits.
0.11
0.04
0.07
0.05
-0.10
0.12
-0.15
-0.12
0.12
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
-0.04
-0.03
0.00
Table 12: Sensitivity analysis wage bargain, 115 million ex ante, S = .3 a
Simulation
no compensating taxation with compensating taxation
relief t raining vouche@ relief t raining voucherb
Prices
Labour costC
Labour productivi ty
Production price
Consumption price
Volumes
Productior@
Employment  (total)e
Employment ( firms)e
Ratio’s
Unemployment  rate
- incl.  r and tf
Government budget
Expenditure@
Wage bill
- relief jobs
- training jobs
Unemployment  insuranceh
Welfare benefitsh
Voucher expenditures
Receip  tsg
Taxes
Gov. budget
Ex ante expenditures
aOutcomes  denote differences between the simulation and the base projection.
bSubsidy  qe uals 7% of the net benefit level in low-productive unemployment.
CGross  labour cost per unit of labour, excluding search costs.
dProduction in the private sector.
eTotal  employment includes relief and training jobs, employment by firms denotes private sector employment.
fThe stock of unemployment plus the stocks of relief and training participants divided by the labour force.
gExpenditures  in billions of euro.
h High-productive  un. individuals receive unemployment insurance, low-productive un. receive welfare benefits.
iExpenditures  ceteris p&bus,  i.e. disregarding behavioural changes.
pert.  changes
0.11 0.05
0.04 0.06
0.07 -0.06
0.05 -0.04
-0.11 0.09
0.13 0.26
-0.15 0.02
abs. changes
-0.12 -0.24
0.12 -0.02
0.11 0.17 -0.04 0.13 0.18 -0.04
0.10 -0.01 -0.02 0.11 -0.01 -0.02
0.00 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00
0.00 0.08 0.05 0.00 0.09 0.05
-0.04 -0.15 -0.08 -0.03 -0.14 -0.09
0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.12
-0.02 0.05
-0.10 -0.07
0.12 0.12
-0.14 0.16
-0.06 0.03
-0.11 0.12
-0.09 0.09
0.17 -0.18
0.15 0.08
0.23 -0.21
-0.14
-0.19
0.05
0.00
0.12
-0.07
0.17
0.10
0.00
0.12
pert.  changes
0.08
0.06
-0.02
-0.02
0.04
0.22
-0.02
abs. changes
-0.21
0.02
0.14
0.00
0.12
-0.14
-0.06
-0.12
-0.09
0.18
0.15
0.24
-0.14
-0.19
0.05
0.00
0.12
Table 13: Sensitivity analysis wage bargain, 115 million ex ante, S = .6 a
Simulation
no compensating taxation with compensating taxation
relief t raining vouche@ relief t raining voucher6
Prices
Labour costC
Labour productivity
Production price
Consumption price
Volumes
Productior#
Employment  (total)e
Employment ( firms)e
Ratio’s
Unemployment  rate
- incl.  r and tf
Government budget
Expenditures9
Wage bill
- relief jobs
- training jobs
Unemployment insuranceh
Welfare benefit&
Voucher expenditures
Receip  tsg
Taxes
Gov. budget
Ex ante expendituresi
pert.  changes
0.12 0.19
0.05 0.09
0.07 0.04
0.06 0.03
-0.11 -0.06
0.12 0.14
-0.16 -0.15
abs. changes
-0.11 -0.13
0.13 0.12
0.11 0.20
0.10 0.00
0.00 0.19
0.00 0.10
-0.04 -0.11
0.00 0.00
-0.02 0.03 0.05 0.10 0.23 0.13
-0.10 -0.17 -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
-0.03 0.15
-0.06 0.04
-0.03 0.10
-0.02 0.08
0.04
0.05
0.10
-0.04 -0.08
-0.09 0.16
-0.02
-0.02
0.00
0.07
-0.05
0.12
-0.15
0.09
-0.20
0.12
0.11
0.00
0.00
-0.03
0.00
pert.  changes
0.24
0.09
0.09
0.07
-0.13
0.08
-0.22
abs. changes
-0.08
0.18
0.22
0.00
0.19
0.10
-0.10
0.00
-0.01
-0.06
-0.01
-0.01
0.01
0.02
0.08
-0.02
-0.06
-0.01
-0.02
0.00
0.07
-0.05
0.12
aOutcomes denote differences between the simulation and the base projection.
bSubsidy  equals 7% of the net benefit level in low-productive unemployment.
‘Gross labour cost per unit of labour, excluding search costs.
dProduction in the private sector.
eTotal  employment includes relief and training jobs, employment by firms denotes private sector employment.
fThe stock of unemployment plus the stocks of relief and training participants divided by the labour force.
9Expenditures  in billions of euro.
hHigh-productive  un. individuals receive unemployment insurance, low-productive un. receive welfare benefits.
iExpenditures  ceteris paribus,  i.e. disregarding behavioural changes.
Table 14: Sensitivity analysis ‘lock-in/treatment effects’, 115 million ex ante’
no compensating taxation with compensating taxation
Simulation CLT
-50%
Pr
+50%
Pt
-50%
Pt
+50%
Pr
+50%
Pr
-50%
Pt Pt
-50% +50%
Prices
Labour costb
Labour productivi ty
Production price
Consumption price
Volumes
ProductionC
Employment  (total)d
Employment ( firms)d
Ratio’s
Unemployment  rate
- incl.  r and te
Government budget
Expendituresf
Wage bill
- relief jobs
- training jobs
Unemployment insurance9
Welfare benefits9
Receiptsf
Taxes
Gov. budget
Ex ante expenditures
0.11
0.05
0.07
0.05
-0.11
0.11
-0.16
-0.11
0.13
0.11 0.05 0.18 0.16 0.12 0.13 0.20 0.17
0.10 0.10 0.00 -0.04 0.11 0.11 0.00 -0.04
0.00 0.00 0.18 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.20
-0.01 0.00 0.03 0.19 -0.01 0.01 0.04 0.19
-0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.20 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.19
-0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.19 0.19
-0.10 -0.09 -0.16 -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
pert.  changes
0.12 0.12
0.04 0.07
0.07 0.04
0.05 0.03
-0.11 -0.06
0.13 0.13
-0.15 -0.13
abs. changes
-0.12 -0.13
0.12 0.11
0.12
0.08
-0.07
-0.05
0.10
0.21
0.03
-0.20
-0.02
0.15
0.04
0.11
0.08
-0.16
0.08
-0.21
-0.07
0.17
pert.  changes
0.16 0.18
0.03 0.06
0.11 0.10
0.08 0.08
-0.16 -0.15
0.10 0.07
-0.19 -0.22
abs. ch,anges
-0.09 -0.07
0.16 0.17
0.14
0.07
-0.04
-0.03
0.07
0.19
-0.01
-0.17
0.01
aOutcomes denote differences between the simulation and the base projection.
bGross  labo ur cost per unit of labour, excluding search costs.
‘Production in the private sector.
dTotal  emp loyment includes relief and training jobs, employment by firms denotes private sector employment.
eThe  stock of unemployment plus the stocks of relief and training participants divided by the labour force.
f Expenditures in billions of euro.
gHigh-productive  un. individuals receive unemployment insurance, individuals in low-productive un. receive welfare benefits.
when we increase training jobs. Production still falls when we increase relief job participation.
Regular employment and production now rise when we increase participation in the training
program. The fall in labour costs, production prices and consumption prices becomes more
pronounced under the voucher scheme, and so does the rise in private sector employment and
production. The scheme becomes self-financing as there is virtually no upward wage pressure
from the subsidy.
The effects of less discounting of the states of low-productive unemployment, relief and
training jobs, S, = 0.6 are the mirror image of the effects with heavier discounting of these
states, see Table 13. Now wages rise more than in the baseline simulations. More participation
in relief and training programs now implies even less private sector production and employment.
This also pushes up expenditures by the government and reduces savings and tax receipts. The
voucher scheme becomes less effective in boosting private sector employment, but the effect is
still positive. Receipts by the government now fall far short of expenditures for the voucher
scheme.
Overall the results for training jobs and the voucher scheme appear quite sensitive to the ex-
tent to which the states of low-productive unemployment, relief and training jobs are discounted
in the wage bargain. The results for relief jobs are hardly affected.
5 3. Treatment/lock-in’ effects
Finally, we consider to what extent the results depend on the net effect of ‘treatment’ and ‘lock-
in’ effects from relief job and training program participation. Unfortunately we do not have
much information on these effects from micro-economic studies. We consider how sensitive the
results are to the efficiency by which relief and training workers are matched to vacant jobs.
Specifically, we consider how the impact of the impuls of 115 million ‘ex ante’ varies when we
decrease or increase the efficiency parameters pr and pt, respectively.
When we vary the efficiency parameter pr for relief job workers, the results are hardly
affected, see Table 14. The outflow rate from relief jobs to private sector employment is quite
low to begin with. We have to look at the two digit level to observe minor changes in labour
productivity, private sector employment and net government receipts.
The results for training jobs are more sensitive to variations in the efficiency parameter I_L~.
When the training program is less succesful in bringing individuals to high-productive employ-
ment production prices rise, which harms the employment effect. The reverse happens when
the training program is more succesful in bringing individuals to high-productive employment.
The effect on private sector employment becomes positive when we increase the pt with 50 per-
cent. When the training program is much more effective, receipts still fall short of expenditures
though.
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6 Summary and concluding remarks
We consider the impact of active labour market policies in the context of an applied general
equilibrium model for the Dutch labour market. We study the impact of publicly provided
relief and training programs, and subsidies in the private sector for low-productive workers
(‘vouchers’). To ease the comparison between the different programs we consider the impact of
an equal ‘ex ante’ impuls of 115 million euro for all programs. ‘Ex post’  expenditures differ due
to feedback effects via the tax base and transfer payments.
Our findings are that relief jobs reduce unemployment and increase production in the public
sector. However, participants have a very low incentive to continue job search for a job in
the private sector. Higher wage and search costs crowd out private sector employment and
production. Without compensating taxation the government runs a net loss of 95 million euro.
For the same ‘ex ante’ impuls training programs reduce unemployment more than relief
jobs. On the individual level training programs speed up the process by which workers move
into private sector employment. However, the higher compensation in the training program
causes wages to rise. The rise in wages leaves a negative net effect on private sector employment.
Production is hardly affected though, due to the rise in the average productivity of the workforce.
Without compensating taxation the government runs a net loss of 132 million euro on the training
program. Expenditures are higher ‘ex post’ due to training costs.
Subsidies for low-productive workers substantially reduce labour costs and hence increase
private sector employment and production. For the same ‘ex ante’ impuls unemployment falls
by less than under the relief and training program. Inactivity (measured by the sum of un-
employment and relief and training job workers) falls more. Individuals are drawn out of the
relief and training program. Without compensating taxation, the voucher scheme implies a net
loss for the government of 41 million euro. Expenditures are much lower ‘ex post’ as there
are substantial savings on transfers and additional receipts due to the rise in the tax base. As
the ‘voucher’ program is less expensive ‘ex post’, the results on private sector employment and
production are even more favourable relative to the other programs after compensating taxation.
We further report some sensitivity analysis on parameters for which we have a weak empirical
basis. The results are quite sensitive to the weight carried by low-productive workers in the wage
bargain, and the effect of training on the flow rate into regular employment. However, the results
are qualitatively the same. Finally, we note that the model predicts that relief jobs reduce the
flow rate into regular employment, and that the flow rate from training programs to regular
employment is higher than from relief jobs to regular employment. This is in line with the
findings of studies on Dutch ALMPs that focus on the individual leve1.27  However, our model
predicts higher outflow rates for both programs than we actually observe. This is probably due
27See  e.g. Table 2 above.
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to selectivity in the participation of these programs.
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Appendix
Stock-flow relations in steady-state
The steady-state assumption that we make in the analysis of the flow model in Figure 2, gives
rise to the the following set of steady-state constraints:
%l,elUL +  %,elR =  (rel,eh +  oel,ul)EL, (39)
%h,ehUH + Tel,ehEL  + rt,ehT = oeh,uhEH 7 (40)
oel,ulEL +  ar,ulR +  ot,ulT = (F.&e1  +  nul,el  +  W&JL, (41)
oeh,uhEH + gt,uhT = (%h,ul + %h,eh)k (42)
%l,rUL = (G,el + +.~l)-& (43)
%d,tUL  = )(nt eh + gt,ul  + at,uh)T)
EL+EH+UL+&+R+T=L, (45)
where L denotes the labour force. We assume a constant labour force and present all stocks as
fractions of the labour force L, i.e. eL = EL/L, eH = EH/L etc. Before we present the steady
state values of the stocks we introduce some notation. Let CXT  the total outflow rate from T,
QJT = *t,eh  + ot,ul  + ot,uh, (46)
let c8R  the total outflow rate from R,
aR = G,el + 6-,ul7
let CXEL the total outflow rate from EL,
aEL = ael,ul  + Tel ,eh 7
(the total outflow from EH is O& uh),> let CIUH  the total outflow rate from UH,
WH = %h,ul  + %h,eh,
(47)
(48)
(4%
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Furthermore, define CXL,R,
aL,R = %.d,elG,ul  + F-,el*ul ,r + %1 ,elG,el l
Then the steady state stocks can be expressed as
eL = a,h,uh%h,ulaTaL,R
N 7
Tel ehaUHaTaL R + %.d,t~RaEL(~t,uh%h,eh + rt,eh%h,ul + nt,eh%h,eh)
eH= ’
Y
N 7
UL =
oeh,uh%h,ulaTaRQEL
N ?
UH =
~eh,uh[~el,eh~T~L,R + aRaEL%l,t(rt,eh  + at,uh)]
N I
r=
a,h,uh%h,ul%l,rQT~EL
N 1
t =
~eh,uh%h,ul%l,taR~EL
.
N
The denominator N in each of those expressions is given by
N -- ~T[~eh,uh%h,ul~EL(~R + &.L~,T)  + aL,R(oeh,uh(‘%h,ul + rel,eh) + rel,ehaUH)]
+%l,t~R~EL[~eh,uh(~t,eh + gt,uh  + &h,ul)
+%h,ehrt,eh + %h,ulrt,eh + %h,ehot,uh]* (57)
Determining the quit rates
The quit rates from employment, relief and training programs under the steady state assumption
are obtained as follows. Dividing (53) by (55) and rearranging gives +.@.  Dividing (53) by (56)
gives ot,ul+ f+h- The data on training jobs indicates that !$Q$  = 0.24. This gives us ot+l and
0t uh.7 Dividing (53) by (54) gives gel  ul> given &&l) gt+l and ot,uh.  Finally, rearranging (54)
gives aeh,uh  given ~T,U~Y  ot,ul~  ot,uh  and ael,ul  l
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